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CASE STUDY O F A FOURTH GENERATIONMRM PROGRAM
ATA CORPORATE AVIATION OPERATOR
Manoj S. Patankar and James C. Taylor

ABSTRACT
Research in aviation maintenance human factors maps the evolution of MRM training programs into four distinct
generations bridging attitude awareness programs, behavior changes, and process and structure changes. This paper
analyzes a fourth generation MRM program from the perspective of the multi-step process, developed by the authors,
as a guide for airlines to develop their own human factors programs. This analysis demonstrates that the corporate
maintenance human factors program under review is a forerunner; however, a few additional, definitive steps during
the planning, implementation, and follow-up would make this program more robust.
INTRODUCTION
Patankar (1999a) presented ten steps to developing a
Maintenance Resource ManagementMaintenance Human
Factors (m)
program in an introdumryworkshop
during the Thirteenth International Human Factors in
Aviation Maintenance Symposium. In the fourteenth
symposium, Taylor & Patankar (2000) praented a
comparativeanalysisoffourgenerationsofMRM programs
based on their field observations at several aviation
maintenance facilities in the United States. The present
paper analyzes a previously published case of a cotporate
aviation operator (cf: Patankar and Taylor, 1999) from the
perspectives of the "ten steps" and the "four generations of
MRM." The authors conclude that this corporate aviation
operator, whether intentionally or not, was successhl in
implementing some of the ten steps, and its program
classifies as a fourth generation MRM program.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The Corporate Case
Instead of using the traditional Crew Resource
Management (CRM) training programs available in the
market, the corporate operator under study--CompanyA-decided to use an alternative approach to risk management.
They chose QuantumPro Management System (QMS), an
innovative management program that focuses on
organizational change through improved communication.
In adopting the QMS program, Company A's strategywas
to effect both an organizational change as well as an
individual change. In order to implement this strategy, the
company had to provide a
and a w.Their
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structure was the requirement of briefings among pilots,
among mechanics, and between the pilots and mechanics.
Their process was the use of "concept alignment process"
(CAP) as a way ofensuringthat all parties are actingon the
same concept. If all parties are not acting on the same
concept, CAP provides a way of resolving ambiguous
andlor conflicting viewpoints among the communicating
parties in various briefings. Atter the indoctrination of the
QMS among the pilots, it was applied in a streamlined
format to the maintenance hction. In this latter
application, it was called Error Reductim and Decision
Making Protocol (ERDMP). It was used for preflight pilotmechanic briefings, post-flight pilot-mechanicdebriefings,
and briefings among the maintenance personnel.
The basis ofthe CAP is a simple communication protocol
that desensitizes rank and provides means for all the
individuals to share information. At the heart of this
protocol is the concept. A concept is defined as an idea,
remark, or an observation that is stated by one person and
is either affirmed or challenged by the co-worker. If a
difference between the points of view is stated, it is the
team's responsibility to seek validation for that concept
from an independent third source. If one concept can be
validated and one cannot, the validated concept shall
become the working concept. If both concepts can be
validated or if neither concept can be validated, the most
conservative of the two is chosen. Once a working concept
is agreed upon, it shall be further scrutinized using a
predefined judgement process. Oilen in this process, the
mechanics, managers, and pilots go beyond this point to
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research the cause of the discrepancy in the concepts and
recommend appropriate changes. Changes have been made
in operatingpoliciesandprocedures,maintenancemanuals,
and other documentation as a died result of this process.
The pilots have been using this process for six years and the
mechanics have employed it for just over two years.
Ten Steps to Developing MRM Programs
Patankar (1999a) presented the following ten steps to
guide new MRM p r w a m developers in designing and
implementing their programs.
Stev 1: Understand the Corvorate Mission or
_PurDose
It is imperative that the Human Factors (HF) manager
understands the corporate mission and abides by the
corporate values for himiher to receive support from the
top-management. Kotter (1998) states that one ofthe main
reasons for change programs to fail is that the changes are
not anchored in the corporation's culture. If the HF
manager does not align hidher MRM program with the
corporate purpose, hdshe risks failure.
"With change, the task is to manage the dynamic, not the
pieces" (Duck, 1998 p.57). The HF manager should be able
t o identi@ all the components required tomake the MRM
program successfUl at hislher airline and then orchestrate
these components such that helshe is able to manage the
dynamic and not the individual pieces. Such an action
requires strong commitment 6om the CEO or aperson who
enjoys an incredible amount of political strength in the
airline.
Stm 2: Personally Practice MRM Princivles
If the HF manager is able to practice some ofthe key HF
principles such as communication skills, teamwork, and
avoiding complacency, hdshe will become an active rolemodel for others to follow. Also, personal practice will
demonstrate the manager's commitment to the MRM
program because "Management is the message. . .
Everything managers say-or don't saydelivers a message.
. .Topmanagement should start by requiring a change of
behavior, and when that yields improved pdormance, the
excitement and beliefwill follow" (Duck, 1998 p. 61-63).

have used representatives kom all the "interest groups," for
example, one could use representatives from the labor
union(s), managemmt, FAA, and outside consultants.
"People are naturally scientific. They must see the reasons
for change" (Martin, 1998p. 131). Once these persons see
the reasons for the change and they have a positive attitude
toward the h4FN program, they exhibit W-compliant
behavior consistently. They will act as positive role models
similar to the HF manager. They will consciously and
unconsciously influence the development and
implementation of the MRM program.
In selecting these key persons, one should also try to seek
leaders rather than managers. Although leadership and
management arenot mutually exclusivequalities, the point
is that a person needs to posses leadership qualities in order
for that person to efktively champion the MRM program.
The reason for this choice is based on Kotter's (1998 p. 38)
observation that "Management is about wping with
complexity and leadership is about wping with change."
S u m s l l implementation of an MRM program is a
cultural change process.
Stev 4: Alim the MRM Mission with the
Corporate Mission
If the goals and vision of an MRM program are not
aligned with those of the airline, the MRM program is not
likely to succeed. Generally, the purpose of most MRM
programs is to bring about a change in behavior such that
it enhancessafa therefore, it is highly likely tobealigned
with the corporate purpose of most airlines. However, if
there is any doubt about this alignment, explicit changes
must be made to the corporate purpose/values prior to
launching an MRM program.
Sometimes, it is evident that the published mission
statement is different from the prevalent practices. For
example, one of the corporate values may be to respect the
employees, yet the employees may be working without a
contract. In such cases, large-scale management changes
need to take place prior to the initiation of an MRM
program.
Step 5: Articulate a Vivid Vision for Your MRM

proeram
Stev 3: Tdentifi and Recruit Key Persons to
Chamion Your MRM Promam
"The scarcest resource in any organization are
performing people" (Drucker, 1998 p. 19). Some airlines

Vision provides guidance about what to preserve and
what to change (Collins & Porras, 1997). The typical MHF
training programs discuss certain desirable behaviors and
caution the participants about unsafe behaviors. However,
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they do not present a clear vision with vivid description of
what it will be like to achieve the MHF goal. Consider the
following example of Sony's envisioned future, as
articulated in the 1950s:
"We will create products that become
pervasive around the world. . .We will be the first
Japanese company to go into the U.S. market and
distribute directly. . . We will succeed with
innovations that U.S. companies have failed at
-such as the transistor radio. Fitly years fiom
now, ourbrandnamewill beas well known asany
in the world.
and will signify innovation and
quality that rival the most innovative companies
anywhere. . . 'Made in Japan' will mean
something fine, not something shoddy" (cf:
Collins & Porras, 1997 p. 237).
Steo 6: Develop an MRM Program
Implementation Strategy
Is the MRM program going to seek an attitude change
first or a behavior change first? A layered approach that
combines both attitude change and behavior change could
be used to offer instruction and practice sessions in small
units. For example, instruct one group of mechanics and
their supervisors in the fundamentals ofhuman factors and
then provide them with practice sessions to implement
these human factors principles in their daily work. Based
on the feedback received from these participants, the
instruction and practice sessions could be refined.
The behavior-first approach is results-driven; therefore,
it "stakes out specific targets and matches resources, tools,
and action plans to requirements ofreaching those targets"
(Schaffer & Thompson, 1998 p.91). If a company has
already completed the awareness part of the training, it is
critical that it uses the data available on effectiveness of
MRM program, and focuses the future efforts on resultsdriven implementation. Consider this remark by the hockey
star Wayne Gretzky, who explained his success by saying,
"I skate where the puck is going to be, not where it has
been" (cited in Augustine, 1998 p.174). From an
implementation perspective, a company needs to think
about why its MRM program will not be implemented. If
the HF manager is able to effectively identifythesereasons,
helshe may be able to plan a counter-strategy and thereby
have a higher probability of success.
While planning the implementation strategy, it is also
essential tonote how exactly one is planning toevaluate the
perfomar;ce of the paiticipmis. Eo :he paiticipaii:~ha;,e

..

..
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any specific incentives to practice the newly learned
behaviors? The HF manager should try to envision why the
participants may not practice the newly learned behaviors
even if they agree with them. The HF manager should try
to identi& the obstacles in practicing the HF-compliant
behaviors because "not removing obstacles to the new
vision" is another key reason for change programs to fail
(Kotter, 1998p. 13). The problem, howeva, is usually with
middle or upper management not willing to make the
required changes. They view the situation from a different
context. For example, in the case of one major airline, the
researchers observed that the airline had initiated selfdirected teams in maintenance to improve the quality of
work. The managers thought that such teams were a threat
to their position. So, they subtly undermined the effort of
the teams and eventually abandoned the concept.
Dismantling the self-directed teams left technicians very
bitter and they lost m t in the management. The
mechanics and the managers were considering the concept
of self-directed teams from diRerent contexts: the
mechanics were using the self-directed teams to make
process changes that improved qualiy, whereas, the
managers were feeling insecure due to the increased selfreliance of their mechanics. "Context is like the color ofthe
light, not the objects in the room. Context colors everything
in the corporation. . . People have contexts just as
organizations do. Our individual context is our hidden
strategy for dealing with life; it determines all the choices
we make" (Goss, Pascale, & Athos, 1998 p. 89-100).
Context can change attitudes for the w o r s e a s seen in the
example above, or for the better.
S t e ~7: Obtain Resource Commitments from
Upper Manapement
A largemle change program such as the MRM program
requires consistent commitment from the management in
terms of the conventional resources like time, personnel,
and money. Some companies may acknowledge the value
of an MRM program, but just may not have the personnel
to spare for training or the budget to actually implement the
changes that aresuggested by their employees. Ifthis is the
case; the upper manapment needs to seriously evaluatethe
company's core purpose and values. Nothing is more
detrimental to the MRM program than the participants
losing fe.:t!? ir? it because they cannot even get the basic
equipment to do their jobs. For example, the researchers
observed that some of the participants from a major
e-1:,,,,,,e's MRM prjgain contimed to i;se k!:loaders as
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ladders even afler their MRh4 training. They knew that this
practice was dangerous, but they were told by their
supervisor to continue with this practice because he did not
have the budget for a new ladder.
Also, some airlines have experienced several changes in
their upper-management in therecent years. Consequently,
themiddle management is not very sure abut the resources
available for the MRM program. Unless, a detailed plan is
endorsed by the top-management and appropriate resources
are allmted to it, the new middle management is not likely
to honor the commihnentsofthepriormiddlemanagement.
Sten 8: Develou Means to Build Em~loyeeTrust
Sometimes, the MRM program has a tendency to be
construed as another management fad ofthe week. To steer
clear of this interpretation, it is essential that the HF
manager takes concrete steps toward building mutual trust
among the employees and a trust in the program. One of
the best ways of developing this trust is to demonstrate
through behavior, action, and results that the program
works. ". . . hust in a time of change is based on two
things: predictability and capability. . . Predictability
consists of~ntentionand ground rules: what are ow general
goals and who will we make decisions? To trust an
organization, both managers and their reports must define
the capability that each is providing; and each side has to
believe that the other is capable of playing the new role"
(Duck, 1998 p. 65-72). Typically, the management seems
to be encouraging the mechanics to use the HF principles
and practice safe behaviors, but on the other hand, they do
not support a mechanic who uses the lock-out tag-out
procedure to stop an unsafe activity. No wonder, in such a
climate, that trust becomes a critical issue. Because of such
experiences of the front-line maintenance personnel, it is
very difficult for MRM champions to establish trust."One
of the paradoxes of change is that trust is hardest to
establish when you need it the most." (Duck, 1998 p. 69).
Step 9: Develon Tools to Measure MRM Success
The tools used to measwe an MRM program's success
should be responsive to the details articulated in the vision
statement and to the program's goals. These tools should
also interrelate very closely with the corporate values. If
there is a strong correlation between the core values,
program goals, program vision, and prcgram measures, the
implementation and continued evolution of the MRh4
program is very likely. In the long-term, it will certainly

have a positive affect on the organizational and
professional cultures at that airline.
A difficulty that many HF managers have experienced is
the difficulty associatedwith provingthe financial viability
of MRM programs Two distinct approaches are now
available to HF managers: Return On Investment (ROI)
from MRM training and Activity Based Costing (ABC).
Taylor (2000) presented a formula to calculate the ROI
from MRM awareness training programs. This formula
acknowledges the concurrent implementation of multiple
safety initiatives and enables the HF manager to calculate
the ROI ern MRM training as a portion ofthe total ROI
fom all safety initiatives. Patankar and Taylor (2000)
training programs
further demonstrated that targetedcan achieve their specific goals with a significant degree of
success. Some change program implementation experts, on
the other hand, are advocating ABC. "It not only measures
what it wsts to do a task, it also records the cost of not
doing, such as the cost of downtime, and the wst of
reworking or scrapping a defective part. The costs of not
doing, which traditional cost accounting cannot and does
notrecord, oflen equal and sometimeseven exceed the costs
of doing. Activity-based costing therefore gives not only
much better cost control, but increasingly, it also gives
result control. Its greatest impact is likely to be on the
service industry" (Drucker, 1998p. 5) Once in a while, the
accountantsneed to be reminded that "enterprises are paid
to create wealth, not control costs." @. 12). "When one
leading company can demonshate the long-term advantage
of its superior performance on quality or innovation or any
other non-6nancial measure, it will change the d e s for all
its rivals forever" @. 26). Whether one measures the
training ROI or uses the ABC approach to quantify the
financial impact of an MRM training program, the results
of such measurements will provide quantitative evidence
that supports the positive effects of good MRM programs.
Nonetheless, non-financial measures such as employee
morale,job satisfixtion, and organizationalattachment can
also be used determine the MRM program's success. The
tools used to measure MRM success must consider b t h
financial and non-financial impact of MRM programs.
Sten 10: Develou Structuresand Processto Sustain
MRM-based Changes
For an MRM program to be truly effective, it must stand
the test of time and management changes. The cutwmes of
these programs should be strong enough to protect the

Page 24

https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol10/iss3/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2001.1281

4

1
1
I

I

I

Patanker and Taylor: Case Study of a Fourth Generation MRM Program at a Corporate Avia

-

-

program and the organizational culture, irrespective of the
management changes. The airline should truly be able to
"preserve the core and stimulate progress" (cf:Collins &
Porras, 1997). Certainly, other change programs will
emerge in the future, but the airline's core values must be
preserved.
Fourth Generation MRM Programs
The fourth generation MRM programs are defined by
Taylor and Patankar (2000) as systemic programs that use
the knowledge gained firom the experienceofthe past three
generations and &om recent innovative processes to
standardize communication and tactical decision-making.
For the first time, these programs are being designed and
implemented kom a systemic perspective. Data &om the
past three generations of MRM programs shows that
different MRM programs usually achieve different results.
Airlines are now adding a skills training module to their
classroom instruction and making it a true 'training"
program that is more likely to result in more open
communication (Patankar & Taylor, 2000). These airlines
are also aware ofthe interpersonal,trust issues that impede
self-disclosure, and they are striving to incorporate a
maintenance emor investigation (MEI) module in their
training, and in their larger program, so that the
participants understand the goal and the procedure of such
investigation. In the skills training module, the airlines are
beginning to train their maintenance personnel to use
simple, standard processes to detect and resolve differences
in information through third-party validation. The airlines
are now bener informed about the capabilities and
limitations of MRM programs, and they are embarking on
a new result-oriented approach to safety through strategic,
system-wide, changes.
Understanding the human factor in unanticivated events.
Real time knowledge
- of what human factors lie behind
classes of maintenance errors is important to obtain, and it
is central to the long-range and comprehensive success of
MRM. Processes for a human-centered maintenance error
investigation (MEI) are becoming objects of serious
interests in aviation maintenance organization (Allen &
Marx, 1994; FAA, 1999). However, full-blown
maintenance experience with such p r o p s is limited.
Recent assessment of ME1 in the U.S. shows that there has
been little commitment yet by either the air carriers or
repair stations to see such error investigation and analysis
become a new way of doing business (Marx, 1998).

Case Sf*

of a Fourth Generution MRM Program

Trust within the maintenance system.
Informal reports tom users suggest that the mechanics'
limited trust of the ME1 process creates an obstacle to its
widespread diffusion. Unless a strong culture for open
communication and assertiveness already exists in their
organization, relatively few mechanics will voluntarily or
willingly disclose what they believe to be the 'teal stoly."
A mechanic's individualism (Taylor, 1999; Taylor &
Patankar, 1999) and self-reliance (Taylor & Christensen,
1998) can create a barrier to their trust in others.
In order to develop a strong safety culture, a maintenance
organization must k t recognize its own organizational
and occupational culture, and it must appreciate the
interplay between these two with the effects of national
origins and cultures of its individual members (Taylor,
1999; Patankar, 1999b).
Diect focus on behavior change
The focus of contemporary MRM programs is now
moving toward active error reduction through structured
communication. Patankar and Taylor (1999) described a
case t o m the corporate aviation environment that uses a
'khavior-change fist'' approach instead of the prevalent
"attitudechange first." In the earlier MRM generations 1
and 3 (cf: Taylor and Patankar, 2000), companies simply
provided classroom instruction and hoped that the desired
change in attitudes and behavior would take place
automatically. This strategy fwused on changing the
participants' attitude toward safety through education and
persuasion, and sometimes skills-training. Its developers
hoped that participants' behavior would change as a
consequence of the classroom experience alone.
Unfortunately, the evaluations of such '?raining" programs
for improving communicationrevealed that the subsequent
behavior change is limited - either in scope or duration
(Taylor and Christensen, 1998).
At the same time there were companies that began to
provide a simple sh.udure and process for c~nmunication
among the following departments associated with aviation
operations: flight crew, maintenance, and administration.
These companies assumed that if they provided a simple,
consistent communication and decision-making process,
and the outcome of this process was promptly acted upon
and continuously supported, their employees would
continue to use it and could eventually change their
attitudes. The immediate interestofthese companieswas in
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changing their employees' work-related communication
behavior. They did not use the better !mown "attitude
change" approach taken in MRM generations 1 and 3.
The Structured Communication Process
Basically, there are two aspects to achieving new
communication behavior: fist, a structure which requires
connected parties to communicate and second, a process
that is followed consistently-regardless of the outcome.
Structure: An example of structure
might be an organizational policy for line
maintenance which requires that for each
flight an aircraft mechanic a d (either by
direction or discretion) as its liaison
mechanic. This person is expected to meet
with the flight crew and discuss the
maintenance issues with them. The pilots are
expected to remain available after arrival to
discuss maintenance discrepancies with the
mechanic. During such discussions, both the
flight crew and the maintenancemechanic@)
are required to follow the preagreed
communication process described below.
Another example of structure b a policy
requiring that (a) maintenance shift turnovers
take place face-to-face and (b) mechanics,
leads, and foremen briefly review the
outgoing shift's use of the preagreed
decision-making process.
The process for enhanced
aviation communication has been observed
and documented (Lynch, 1996; Patankar &
Taylor, 1999). Its originatorshave titled it the
Concept Alignment Process (CAP). Figure 1

m:

illustrates a flow chart of this process.
According to CAe, a "concept" is an idea or
a piece of information presented by an
observer o t or aparty to, a technical decision.
All members are expected to present their
concepts. If the members present differing
concepts, the CAP is initiated. Once the
difference in concepts is recognized in Step 1
(see figurel), the participants must seek
validation of their concepts (Step 2) through
third-party source such as a flight manual, air
traffic controller, maintenance manual,
company policy, etc. If only one concept can
bevalidated, it is executed (Step 3). If none of
the concepts can be validated or if all the
concepts can be validated, the most
conservative concept is chosen (Step 4). The
chosen course of action, when executed in
Step 5, will eliminate "active failures" (cf:
Maurino, Reason, & Lee, 1997).
Additionally, when multiple concepts are
stated, whether valid or not, the members are
expected to take the additional steps (Step 6)
to investigate the reasons for the existence of
multiple concepts. Such an investigation is
aimed at providing systemic solutions to
minimize the occurrence of invalid concepts
and thereby minimize "latent failures" (cf:
Mamino, Reason, and Lee, 1997), as
indicated by Step 7. In figure 2, steps 6 and 7
are presented with dashed l i e because most
people tend to accept the first-level finish,
Finish 1 rather than pursuing the process two
sets fiuther.

-
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,-----------------------a
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Figure 1: Flow chart for the Concept Alignment Process

The CAP addresses the following causes of human error
accidents (Lynch, 1996): (a) non-adherence to procedure,
(b) incorrect tactical decisions, (c) lack of attention or
complacency, and (d) failure to challenge another
member's error.
The CAP provides objective procedures, thus making the
use o f this process observable to all. It provides team
members with decision-making and conflict resolution
methodology. It reduces chances of acting on incorrect
concepts by facilitating collaborative task completion and
decision-making. It reduces interpersonal conflict and
defensiveness through the understanding that what is
challenged is the concept and not the individual. All of
these benefits have been observed in the use of CAP in the
maintenanceen~irorir~~ent.
The followingdescription ofthe
corporate case highlights those benefits.
Oreanizational safeht culture and management su~oort
Assuming that organizational culture has the potential for
thegreatest impact on safety, Helmreich and ~ e r r i t(It 998)
present strategiestounifyandstrengthentheorganizational
culture and aim to introduce safety as a shared value.
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Management's commitment, Helmreich and Merrin
suggest, is prerequisite to successful implementation of a
new process or a new protocol because although an
organizational culture is shaped by all ofthe employees, an
organizational change is defined by the upper management.
"Senior Management is a part of, not apart fkom, the
culture; that is, it doesnot look down upon the organization
and direct it by edict, rather it influences the culture as a
participating element within the culture" (p.124). The
change has to betop-down, through concrete and consistent
examples.
METHODOLGY
This research compares Company A's MRM program
with the ten-step process recommended by Patankar
(1999a). Additionally, the characteristics of Company A's
MRM program, especially its strategy and effectiveness,
were mapped against those of the four generations
classified by Taylor and Patankar (2000).
The data collection and analysis would have been easier
and more objective if the corporate operator had a written
MRM plan. In the absence of such formal plan, the authors
have based their comments on field observations and

Pasc 27
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interview data.
RESULTS
Stepby-step comparison
Step 1: Understand the cornorate mission or
The company's core purpose is "to make technical
contributions for the advancement and welfare of
humanity;" whiletheaviation unit'spurpose was to provide
the company employees with a safe aircratl. The aviation
unit operated scheduled service to four to five plant
locations to transport engineers and managers. On some
occasions, they also flew the top executives to specific
destinations outside their normal routes. When asked
whether they would delay or cancel a flight for a safetyrelated issue, the management and the employees
consistently said that they would. Such overriding
importance of safety over production goals was supported
by ow observations of the times when two oftheir aircraft
experienced maintenance problems.
One of the parent wmpany's core values is innovation.
The company will not develop a product if the technology
is not innovative enough. Perhaps, it is because ofthis core
value that the aviation manager wanted to find a Crew
Resowce Management program that was better than the
type practiced in the airline industry. Also, such CRM
program-the QuantumPro course--would be in perfect
alignment with the wmpany's core purpose.
Steo 2: Personally practice MRM orincioles
In his book about how the company was built, m e ofthe
founders ofthe company expressed his unique objective: to
expand and diversie only when the company can build on
its existing strengths, and with the recognition that it has
proven capability tomakea contribution. Sincetheaviation
manager has been with the company for ova 25 years, he
seemed to be l l l y attuned with the founders' ideology. He
was among the fist to take the QuantumPro course, and
then he baame the one to model its implementation.
Step 3: Identifv and recruit kev persons to
chamoion vow MRM oromam
This aviation department manager wuld not have done
a better job in i d e n t i w g and recruiting the key persons to
champion the QuantumPro program. One of his pilots
became a complete believer in the CAP process, and
became a crusader for its consistent implementation. This
pilot worked with the maintenance personnel and together,
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they customized the CAP process for maintenance use.
The director of maintenance took keen interest in the
QuantumPro course and modified its content to meet the
maintenance department's needs. The maintenance
personnel called it ' Z m r Reduction and Decision Makimg
Process (ERDMP)."
The aviation manager, the chief pilot, the diuector of
maintenance, and some highly enthusiastic program
champions, actively modeled proper implementation ofthe
QuantumProprogram.Consequently, theprocess was taken
seriously by all personnel and the employees effected
several safety-related changes in the organization.
Step4: AlimtheMRMmission with the coruorate

mission'

Although the corporate mission was clear and the
aviation deputment's purpose was clear, the mission ofthe
CRhVh4RM program was not documented.
It is possible that the aviation department did not
encounter any obstacles ftom the corporate management in
implementing the CRiWMRM program because these
programs were, at least intuitively, compatible with the
corporate mission and purpose. Nonetheless, a written
mission and goals document would have been useful.
Step 5: Articulate a vivid vision for vow

MRM

&
Although the aviation department did not have a written
vision for either their CRM or MRM program, their
program championswereextremelyeffectiveinkeepingthe
spirit of these programs vibrant. Perhaps, this live
enthusiasm for both programs was more effective than a
written statement by their manager. As the concept
alignment process was practiced and subsequent structural
or procedural changes weremade, the employees' belief in
the program increased. Having an enthusiastic support
ftom the program champions facilitated an incremental
belief in the program among all the employees.
Steo 6: Develoo an MRM oroaam
imdementation straten,1
Upon reviewing the various types of Crew Resource
Management programs that were available in the market,
the aviation department manager and his pilots chose CMR

' Noh:The wrpomte ose n&

to s6engthen thew areas
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hc.'s QuantumPro because it focused on observable
behavioral changes irrespective of the internal attitudiial
changes that may or may not take place within the
individuals. However, only the flight department received
a regular class in CRM. The maintenance department had
only its director go through the class, and rest of the
personnel got some training fiom one of the pilots and the
maintenance director. So, it seems that the maintenance
department may not have had a clear MRM program
implementation strategy. However, the program
champions, both mechanics as well as pilots, were very
enthusiastic about the CRMiMRM program and they
inspired the rest of the employees to use the QuantumPro
system and its derivative, the ERDMP.
Stew 7: Obtaim resowce commitments kom upper
management
The original QuantumPro course attended by pilots and
the director of maintenance was quite expensive. This
course also included takehome exercises that consumed
several hours ofpersonal time. Perhaps, this cost is not as
significant as the cost of changes that result &om
implementing such a CRMIMRM program. The authors
did not note any explicit resource commitments other than
the course costs. However, the aviation department
manager was effective in implementing structural and
procedural changes in their daily business, asraommended
though the implementation of the CRM/MRM program.
S t e ~8: Develop means to build emloyee trust
The aviation depamnent manager, the chiefpilot, and the
director ofmaintenance were able to build a strong sense of
trust in QuantumRo and ERDMP. The researchers
witnessed some instances wherethemaintenance personnel
and the pilots had the opportunity to follow the preagreed
process and determine corrective action. When each party
observed that the process was successll and their
managers supported it, regardless of the outcome, their
trust in the process increased.
Step 9: Develo~tools to measure MRM success1
The CRM success was beiig documented by some pilots,
but the maintenance success was not getting such attention.
The case study presented by Patankar and Taylor (1999)
constitutes external evaluation, but the company needs an
internal, more regular evaluation system.

Stew 10: Develoo structures and orocesses to
sustain MRM chances'
Withii a year of implementing the MRM program, the
company went through a layoff cycle. Now, the company
has acquired new aircraft and has hired a new director of
maintenance as well as some new mechanics and pilots.
Since the department manager has remained the same and
some of the original CRMtMRM program champions are
still with the company, it reasonable to expect a resurgence
in the MRM program in the near future.
A Fourth Generation MRM Program
Based on the experience of the 6rst three generations of
MRM programs, the fourth generation programs, such as
the Company A case, are starting to address the issue of
balance among individual and organizational changes. In
theory, both the organization and the individual must
change in order to effect a long-term
change in the safety culture. The &st generation MRM
program customizedtheconceptsfrom flight-CRMtraining
to maintenance-CFWMRh4 training by focusing on
teamwork-munication
between two or more
individuals - but it was still personal change and little
attempt was made to support it through organizational
structure or process. The second generation MRM
programs used focus groups to solve specific problems
resulting in some organizational changes and some
individual changes, but because these programs were
focused at specific problems, once problems were solved
and to continue the process proved difficult, the programs
were discontinued. The third generation MRM programs
focused on individual awarenessresulting in mostly passive
individual change (Patankar and Taylor, In h i t ) .
Now, as illustrated in Figure 2 below, the fourth
generation MRM programs are trying balance the
organizational change with the individual change. Such
balance provides structure and processes for individuals to
practice the desired behaviors, as well as the
encouragement and personal support for individualstaking
a positive attitude about safety, as well as knowledge and
skills for how to do it. Strategy or purpose guides the
balance. If either the organization or the individual does
not perform the requisite function, the resultant behavior
will be unbalanced, and it will not achieve the higher levels
that are possible through planning (Taylor & Patankar,
2000).

' Note: The corporatecase needs to mengthen these areas
Page 29
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Figure 2: The balance between organizational change and individual change

CONCLUSION
The corporate aviation case discussed in this paper, used a
fourth generation MRM program and demonstrated a
superior implementation strategy. Many of the traditional
barriers to MRM implementation such as lack of
management follow-up, loss of focus due to employee
turnover, and lack of skills training on how to use the
MRM knowledge were overcome by Company A.
Additionally, the organizational culture at Company a
valued innovation and strived to achieve a balance between

Page 30
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the individual change (change in attitude and knowledge)
and organizational change (by providing skuctures and
processes that facilitate MRM implementation weak in
some details of MRM implementation, it demonstrates a
superior implementation strategy. It seems as though some
of the steps in this case were informal; however, the
corporate culture is such that it seeks to change their
organization as well as the individual.0
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